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ALVIN GOLDMAN'S "A CAUSAL THEORY OF KNOWING" 
ALM. Rival 
1. I n t r o d u c t i o n 
A l v i n G o l d m a n is m o s t we l l k n o w n fo r a series o f natural is t ic a c c o u n t o f k n o w l e d g e a n d 
jus t i f ied bel ief. T h e init ial o f t hese a p p e a r e d in his p a p e r " A Causa l T h e o r y o f K n o w i n g ? 
a c c o r d i n g t o w h i c h k n o w l e d g e a m o u n t s t o t r u e be l ie f a p p r o p r i a t e l y c a u s e d b y t h e fact that 
m a k e s it t r u e . S o o n after, he rep laced this a c c o u n t w i t h a d i f fe ren t o n e , a c c o r d i n g t o w h i c h 
k n o w l e d g e a m o u n t s t o t r u e be l ie f tha t is p r o d u c e d b y a re l iable p rocess . Va r i ous p r o b l e m s 
d e t e r m i n e d th is n e w a c c o u n t a n d o t h e r s tha t G o l d m a n p u b l i s h e d af ter it. H o w e v e r , t h o s e 
a c c o u n t s h a v e b e e n p e r h a p s t h e m o s t in f luent ia l t heo r i es of k n o w l e d g e a n d jus t i f ied 
be l ie f p r o d u c e d in t h e last ha l f - cen tu ry . T h e y o f fer a n e w a p p r o a c h t o the i r top ics - an 
a p p r o a c h tha t appea ls t o natural is t ic no t i ons l ike causa t ion a n d re l iabi l i ty as o p p o s e d t o 
n o r m a t i v e n o t i o n s l ike permiss ib i l i t y a n d o b l i g a t i o n . T h e use o f s u c h natural is t ic no t i ons 
in p lace o f n o r m a t i v e no t i ons w a s fa i r ly d is t inc t i ve to G o l d m a n ' s w o r k w h e n h e w r o t e it, 
b u t has s ince c o m e to b e fa i r ly c o m m o n a m o n g ana ly t i c e p i s t e m o l o g i s t s . T h i s t r e n d is d u e 
in n o smal l pa r t t o G o l d m a n ' s o w n wr i t i ngs . 
Ep i s temo log l s t s h a v e a l w a y s r e c o g n i z e d t h e s ign i f i cance o f causa l p rocesses in a c c o u n t i n g 
fo r o u r k n o w l e d g e o f t h i ngs . In d iscuss ions o f p e r c e p t i o n , m e m o r y a n d reason ing , fo r 
e x a m p l e , it is usua l ly a s s u m e d tha t t h e s e w a y s o f c o m i n g t o k n o w are f u n d a m e n t a l l y 
causa l . W e p e r c e i v e t h i n g s a n d t h u s c o m e t o h a v e k n o w l e d g e a b o u t t h e m v ia c o m p l e x 
causa l p rocesses ; m e m o r y is,at least in par t , t h e r e t e n t i o n o f p r e v i o u s l y g a i n e d k n o w l e d g e 
t h r o u g h s o m e so r t o f causal p rocess ; a n d reason ing is a causal p rocess tha t takes bel iefs 
as inpu ts a n d g e n e r a t e s bel iefs as o u t p u t s . 
A causal t h e o r y o f k n o w l e d g e i s a f o r m o f e x t e r n a l ism a n d is based o n t h e f u n d a m e n t a l idea 
tha t a p e r s o n k n o w s s o m e p r o p o s i t i o n , p, o n l y if t h e r e is an a p p r o p r i a t e causa l c o n n e c t i o n 
b e t w e e n t h e s tate o f affairs tha t makes p t r ue a n d t h e person 's be l ie f in p. A l t h o u g h this 
k i nd o f t h e o r y has roo ts tha t e x t e n d t o anc ien t t imes , c o n t e m p o r a r y ve r s i ons t r y to m a k e 
m o r e accu ra te t h e n a t u r e o f t h e causal c o n n e c t i o n s r e q u i r e d fo r k n o w l e d g e . T h e causal 
t h e o r y is c l ose l y re la ted to o t h e r f o r m s o f ex te rna l i s t theor ies , s u c h as t h e c o n c l u s i v e 
reasons t h e o r y , i n f o rma t i on - t heo re t i c v i e w s a n d t h e va r i ous f o r m s o f re l iab i l ism. 
Usua l l y e p i s t e m o l o g i s t s h a v e gene ra l l y r e c o g n i z e d t h e f o l l o w i n g d i f fe ren t sources o f 
k n o w l e d g e (o f jus t i f i ca t ion o r e v i d e n c e ) : p e r c e p t i o n , i n t r o s p e c t i o n , r e a s o n , m e m o r y , a n d 
rel iable (or a p p r o p r i a t e ) a u t h o r i t y ( that is, t e s t i m o n y ) . O n e o f t h e v i r t u e s o f G o l d m a n ' s 
ar t ic le (bes ides its a t t e m p t t o o v e r c o m e Get t ie r ' s p r o b l e m s ) is his f o c u s u p o n a v a r i e t y o f 
sou rces o f e v i d e n c e , a n d his care fu l analys is o f w h a t m u s t b e t h e case if t h e s e sources are 
to g i v e u p k n o w l e d g e . 
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2. C a u s a l c o n n e c t i o n s a n d p e r c e p t i o n 
T h e causa l t h e o r y o f p e r c e p t i o n Is a n exerc ise in w h a t Sir Pe te r S t r a w s o n f a m o u s l y cal led 
desc r i p t i ve m e t a p h y s i c s . D e s c r i p t i v e m e t a p h y s i c s a ims ' t o lay ba re t h e m o s t g e n e r a l 
f ea tu res o f o u r c o n c e p t u a l s t ruc ture ' ; ! P. F. S t rawson1959 : p, 9) a n d t h e causa ! t h e o r y 
p u r p o r t s t o i den t i f y o n e o f t h e s e features , o n e e l e m e n t in t h e ' m a s s i v e cen t ra l co re o f 
h u m a n th i nk ing w h i c h has n o history ' . ( Ib id. 10.) It says t ha t t h e c o n c e p t o f a causal 
c o n n e c t i o n , w h i c h u n q u e s t i o n a b l y has a f u n d a m e n t a l p lace in o u r t h i n k i n g a b o u t t h e 
na tu ra l w o r l d w e inhab i t a n d in o u r th ink ing a b o u t o u r o w n p o w e r t o e f fect o r p r e v e n t 
c h a n g e s in i t is a lso impl ic i t in ' t he o r d i n a r y n o t i o n o f p e r c e i v i n g . 
W h e n I see a cha i r in f r on t o f m e , as a resul t , I c o m e t o b e l i e v e tha t t h e r e is a cha i r in f ron t 
o f m e . In th is case, t h e fac t t ha t t h e r e is a chair in f r on t o f m e causes m y bel ie f in t h e 
a p p r o p r i a t e w a y . 
S t r u c t u r e u p o n Paul Gr ice 's causa l t h e o r y , (Paul Gr i ce , 1961; p p . 121-152). G o l d m a n claims 
that * ..a n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n o f S's see ing that t h e r e is a v a s e in f r o n t o f h i m is that t he re 
be a ce r ta in k i nd o f causal c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e p r e s e n c e o f t h e v a s e a n d S's be l i ev ing 
tha t a v a s e is p r e s e n t " 
P e r c e p t i o n is p r o b a b l y t h e s imples t t y p e o f causal c o n n e c t i o n l ead ing to k n o w l e d g e . 
G o l d m a n a d o p t s t h e analys is o f Pau l Gr ice , a c c o r d i n g t o w h i c h a necessa ry c o n d i t i o n fo r 
S's see ing tha t t h e r e is a v a s e in f r on t o f h i m is tha t t h e r e is a causal c o n n e c t i o n o f a cer ta in 
so r t b e t w e e n S's be l ie f tha t h e sees a v a s e a n d " t h e p r e s e n c e o f t h e v a s e . " G o l d m a n d o e s 
no t t r y t o e x p l a i n t h e speci f ic causal p rocess i n v o l v e d . But h e n o t e s tha t w e w o u l d no t say 
tha t s o m e o n e sees s o m e t h i n g un less t h e re levan t causal p rocess has o c c u r r e d . 
T o d r i v e th is p o i n t G o l d m a n sugges t s a t h o u g h t - e x p e r i m e n t . S u p p o s e s o m e o n e 
i n t e r p o s e d a h o l o g r a m o f a vase b e t w e e n S a n d t h e v a s e , t h u s cu t t i ng o f f t h e causal 
c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n S a n d t h e v a s e . In tha t case, w e w o u l d n o t say tha t h e sees t h e vase , 
t h o u g h w e c o u l d a l l o w tha t h e k n o w s ( b y s o m e o t h e r m e a n s ) t ha t t h e r e is a v a s e be fo re 
h i m . So "see ing t h a t " is t r ea ted as a specia l case o f " k n o w i n g that , " It requ i res a causa l 
c o n n e c t i o n . 
For t h e m o m e n t , w e wi l l r e g a r d t h e p rocess lead ing t o p e r c e p t u a l k n o w l e d g e as n o t 
i n v o l v i n g In fe rence . It d o e s no t s e e m reasonab le , f r o m o u r e x p e r i e n c e , tha t w e d o 
m a k e in fe rences f r o m " ideas " o r "sense d a t a " o r b ra in states w h e n w e k n o w s o m e t h i n g 
pe rcep tua l l y . 
3. C a u s a l c o n n e c t i o n s and) m e m o r y 
W h e n I r e m e m b e r a past e v e n t t h e r e m u s t be a causal c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n m y earl ier 
e x p e r i e n c e a n d m y p r e s e n t t h o u g h t . S o m e o f o u r k n o w l e d g e is b a s e d at least in par t o n 
m e m o r y , a n d m e m o r y i tself is a causal process. A be l ie f at t h e p r e s e n t can be t raced back 
t o a p r e v i o u s be l ie f as a cause . A s be fo re , G o l d m a n d o e s n o t t r y t o g i v e a de ta i l ed a c c o u n t 
o f h o w t h e p rocess w o r k s . 
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T h e n e e d fo r a causal c o n n e c t i o n is s h o w n b y c o n s i d e r i n g t w o t y p e s o f cases. In t h e first, 
o n e be l i eves tha t p at a t i m e a n d t h e n later be l ieves p a g a i n . T h i s m a y o c c u r w i t h o u t 
be ing a case o f r e m e m b e r i n g . In t h e s e c o n d , o n e k n o w s t h a t . p at o n e t i m e a n d k n o w s 
tha t p later. T h i s s e c o n d t y p e o f case c o u l d h a p p e n w i t h o u t m e m o r y , as t h e r e c o u l d be a 
d i f fe ren t s o u r c e o f t h e be l ie f o r k n o w l e d g e at t h e t w o t i m e s , s u c h as p e r c e p t i o n at t h e first 
t i m e a n d t e s t i m o n y at t h e s e c o n d . 
A f u r t h e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n is tha t t h e m e r e h a v i n g o f a " m e m o r y imp ress i on " i s n o t suf f ic ient 
fo r r e m e m b e r i n g . A m e m o r y imp ress ion m a y b e s t imu la ted b y an e x t e r n a l source , a n d in 
s u c h a case is no t c a u s e d b y t h e o r ig ina l bel ief. G o l d m a n ho lds tha t th is is no t a case o f 
r e m e m b e r i n g . 
Final ly, k n o w l e d g e m a y b e t r ansm i t t ed b y a c o m b i n a t i o n o f p e r c e p t i o n a n d m e m o r y . O n e 
sees tha t p at a t ime , f o r m s a be l ie f that p, a n d later c o m e s t o b e l i e v e it a n e w o n t h e basis 
o f m e m o r y . A s ing le causal p rocess w o u l d h a v e u n i t e d t h e fac t w i t h t h e later belief. 
4. C a u s a l c o n n e c t i o n s a n d i n f e r e n c e 
G o l d m a n w i s h e s t o r e m a i n neu t ra l o n w h e t h e r in ferent ia l p rocesses are causa l . (No t i ce 
tha t his a c c o u n t is s u p p o s e d t o a p p l y to emp i r i ca l p ropos i t i ons o n l y - h e cons ide rs t h e 
t rad i t iona l J T B analys is suf f ic ient fo r non -emp i r i ca l c laims.) But h e d o e s t h i nk tha t w e can 
e x p a n d t h e causal cha ins o f p e r c e p t i o n a n d m e m o r y us ing in fe rences .as l o n g as t hese are 
w a r r a n t e d . 
T h e cases o f d i rec t p e r c e p t i o n a n d r e m e m b e r i n g are fa i r ly s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d , because t h e y 
i n v o l v e p rocesses tha t are c lear ly causa l .The process b y w h i c h s o m e o n e reasons exp l i c i t l y 
is a lso b e p r e t t y c lear ly a causal p rocess . For e x a m p l e , o n e m a y c a r r y o u t t h e reason ing 
process b y a k i nd o f in ter io r c o n v e r s a t i o n "S ince s u c h - a n d - s u c h is t rue , p m u s t also be 
t rue . " 
But G o l d m a r v w a n t s t o take i n fe rence m o r e b road ly . O n e m a y h a v e k n o w l e d g e based 
o n i n fe rence w i t h o u t h a v i n g g o n e t h r o u g h t h e p rocess o f in fe r r ing expl ic i t ly . G o l d m a n ' s 
e x a m p l e is t h e be l ie f tha t a n e a r b y m o u n t a i n has e r u p t e d h u n d r e d s o f yea rs ago . T h e 
basis for th is be l ie f is t h e o b s e r v a t i o n o f sol id i f ied lava l y ing a b o u t , a l ong w i t h " va r i ous 
' b a c k g r o u n d ' bel iefs a b o u t t h e p r o d u c t i o n o f lava. " It i m p o r t a n t t o n o t e that t hese 
" b a c k g r o u n d " b e l i e f s are no t g e n e r a l l y to be f o u n d in t h e cha in l ink ing t h e ob jec t to t h e 
belief. 
G o l d m a n th inks tha t k n o w l e d g e in th is case requ i res a causal p rocess as w e l l . H e descr ibes 
a va r ian t s imi lar t o t h e h o l o g r a m var ian t o f t h e v a s e case. S o m e o n e l o n g a g o r e m o v e d 
t h e lava tha t w a s b l o w n o f f t h e m o u n t a i n , t h e n later s o m e o n e e lse sca t te red s o m e lava 
r o u n d . T h e causa l c h a i n w o u l d h a v e o r i g i na ted f r o m t h e n e w lava, a n d t h e p e r s o n w o u l d 
n o t k n o w tha t t h e m o u n t a i n e r u p t e d . " A necessa ry c o n d i t i o n o f S k n o w s tha t p is that his 
be l i ev ing p b e c o n n e c t e d w i t h p b y a causal c h a i n . 
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T h e e x a m p l e d o e s no t s h o w , h o w e v e r , that S k n o w s b y In fe rence tha t t h e m o u n t a i n 
e r u p t e d . Fo r th is t o ho ld , g i v e n G o l d m a n ' s c o n d i t i o n , t h e In ferent ia l p rocess l ink ing t h e 
p e r c e p t i o n o f t h e lava t o t h e conc lus i on that t h e m o u n t a i n e r u p t e d . He re , G o l d m a n says 
that he is inc l ined to c o n s t r u e t h e p rocess o f i n fe rence as a causal p rocess , s ince t h e n e w 
bel ie f is b a s e d o n t h e be l ie f f r o m w h i c h it w a s in fe r red . 
O n e n e e d no t d o s o , h o w e v e r , t o reconc i le t h e causal c o n d i t i o n w i t h in ferent ia l k n o w l e d g e . 
Al l tha t n e e d b e d o n e is t o be care fu l a b o u t h o w "causa l " is u n d e r s t o o d in t h e cond i t i on . 
T h u s t h e "causal c h a i n " r equ i red fo r a n y k n o w l e d g e r e m a i n s " c a u s a l " w h e n in ferent ia l l inks 
are a d d e d to it. But th is d o e s no t i m p l y that t he re are "causal c o n n e c t i o n s " a s a resul t . 
5. C a u s a l c o n n e c t i o n s a n d t e s t i m o n y 
T h e o t h e r t y p e o f k n o w l e d g e that m i g h t be g i v e n a causal a c c o u n t is k n o w l e d g e f r o m t h e 
t e s t i m o n y o f a n o t h e r p e r s o n . T h i s t y p e is s o m e w h a t m o r e c o m p l i c a t e d t h a n t h e o thers . 
Say tha t a p e r s o n T c o m e s t o be l i eve that p t h r o u g h a causal c h a i n e n d i n g in p e r c e p t i o n . 
T h e n t h e be l ie f causes an asser t ion that p ( the t e s t i m o n y ) as a n aud ib l e s o u n d . T h i s s o u n d 
causes S to be l i eve tha t T is asser t ing that p, a n d that bel ie f causes S to be l i eve that T 
be l ieves tha t p. Final ly, th is bel ie f a b o u t t h e testi f ier 's be l ie f causes S t o be l i eve tha t p. 
In th is s tep p rocess , b a c k g r o u n d bel iefs p lay a ro le aga in . G o l d m a n calls a t t en t i on to the 
fact tha t t h e be l ie f tha t T be l ieves tha t p m a y requ i re , in add i t i on t o be l ie f that T asser ted 
tha t p, bel iefs a b o u t T s s incer i ty . Pe rhaps e v e n a n o t h e r bel ie f is n e e d e d , t o t h e ef fect that 
T u n d e r s t a n d s w h a t h e is asser t ing . 
T h e passage f r o m t h e bel ie f tha t T be l ieves that p to S's o w n bel ie f tha t p requ i res m o r e 
r isky b a c k g r o u n d bel iefs. A t t h e m i n i m u m , S m u s t be l i eve tha t T is a c o m p e t e n t j u d g e 
w i t h respec t t o t h e k i nd o f i n f o rma t i on e x p r e s s e d b y p. S s h o u l d also b e l i e v e tha t S is in a 
pos i t i on to be l i eve co r rec t l y tha t p in t h e p resen t ins tance, say b y see ing tha t p. 
E v e n t s c a n be causa l ly l i nked t o o u r bel iefs t h r o u g h cha ins o f t e s t i m o n y . W h y does 
G o l d m a n th i nk w e n e e d to recons t ruc t t h e causal cha in lead ing f r o m t h e e v e n t t o o u r 
bel iefs in s u c h cases? 
" In his C o n t e m p o r a r y E p i s t e m o l o g y , Ra lph B a e r g e n ma in ta ins tha t w h a t g o e s w r o n g in 
t h e Ge t t i e r cases is: " t he ta rge t bel ie f is t rue , b u t t h e w a y in w h i c h it is t r u e isn't w h a t t h e 
sub jec t has in m i n d . O n e has t h e fee l ing that these bel iefs are o n l y acc iden ta l l y t rue , 
a n d this s e e m s t o be w h a t p r e v e n t s us f r o m r e g a r d i n g t hese bel iefs as k n o w l e d g e . T h e 
w e a k n e s s o f t h e J T B t h e o r y , t h e n , s e e m s to be tha t it doesn ' t ru le o u t t h e poss ib i l i ty that 
t h e t a rge t be l ie f c o u l d b e t r u e o n l y acc iden ta l l y " (Ra lph B a e r g e n , 1995; p. 110). A c c o r d i n g 
to Baergen,".. . i t is i m p o r t a n t tha t y o u r m e n t a l r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f t h e causal cha in be cor rec t ; 
a n y e r ro r w o u l d p r e v e n t t h e be l ie f f r o m c o u n t i n g as k n o w l e d g e . Fo r e x a m p l e , s u p p o s e 
y o u read a n e w s p a p e r a c c o u n t o f a h o c k e y g a m e a n d f o r m t h e be l ie f tha t t h e final score 
w a s 3 t o 1 fo r C h i c a g o . T h i s Is t h e co r rec t score, b u t the n e w s p a p e r has ac tua l ly m i sp r i n ted 
it as 8 to 1; in y o u r c o p y o f t h e p a p e r t h e le f t -hand side o f t h e "8" is f a d e d a n d y o u m is read 
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it as a "3 . " in th is case y o u r bel ie f is t r ue a n d jus t i f ied , bu t because y o u r r e c o n s t r u c t i o n 
o f t h e causal cha in is i nco r rec t it does no t c o u n t as k n o w l e d g e . Y o u r r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f it 
w o u l d g o s o m e t h i n g like t h i s : T h e f inal score w a s 3 t o 1 fo r C h i c a g o , t h e spor ts r e p o r t e r 
o b s e r v e d this, t h e n e w s p a p e r p r i n t ed it (this Is t h e m is taken p a r t - w h a t it p r i n t ed wasn ' t 
t h e co r rec t score) , a n d I r ead it. Y o u m i g h t th ink tha t th is cons t ra in t Is j u s t a n o t h e r 
e x a m p l e o f In te rna l i sm, b u t ac tua l ly it has a n o t h e r m o t i v a t i o n . P lac ing th is res t r ic t ion o n 
recons t ruc t i ons p r e v e n t s acc identa l l y t r ue bel iefs f r o m c o u n t i n g as k n o w l e d g e (as in t h e 
G e t t i e r cases ) " ( Ib id. p. 117). 
6. F o r m u l a t i o n o f t h e c a u s a l t h e o r y o f k n o w i n g 
In t h e in te rna l i s t -o r ien ted e n v i r o n m e n t w h i c h d o m i n a t e d e p i s t e m o l o g y f r o m t h e t ime of 
Descar tes unt i l t h e m i d d l e o f t h e t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y , it w a s no t c o n s i d e r e d a p p r o p r i a t e to 
re fer t o t h e causal h i s t o r y o f a be l ie f in p r o v i d i n g a n analys is , o r de f i n i t i on , o f t h e pos i t i ve 
ep i s tem ic status o f tha t be l ie f .Ra ther . the ep is temo log ls t ' s w o r k w a s t o p r o v i d e def in i t ions 
o f c o n c e p t s s u c h as jus t i f i ca t ion a n d k n o w l e d g e i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f a n y a s s u m e d causal 
c o n n e c t i o n s w i t h t h e e x t e r n a l w o r l d , a n d t h e n t o s h o w h o w , f r o m s u c h ana lyses , o n e 
c o u l d a r g u e ( ' in ternal ly ' ) t ha t s u c h causal c o n n e c t i o n s e x i s t . T o d o o t h e r w i s e w o u l d be t o 
b e g t h e q u e s t i o n aga ins t skep t i c i sm a b o u t t h e e x t e r n a l w o r l d . 
S ince t h e 1 9 6 0 s , t h e r e h a s b e e n a c h a n g e a w a y f r o m the in te rna l i s t pos i t i on in e p i s t e m o l o g y . 
T h e causal t h e o r y o f k n o w i n g is o n e o f t h e ear l y v e r s i o n s o f e x t e r n a l i s m , i n t r o d u c e d b y 
A l v i n G o l d m a n a n d c o n c e i v e d p r imar i l y as a r e s p o n s e to t h e Get t ie r p r o b l e m w h i c h had 
a p p e a r e d o n l y a f e w y e a r s earl ier. In Ge t t i e r e x a m p l e s , a p e r s o n , 5, has a jus t i f ied bel ie f in 
s o m e t h i n g tha t is o n l y co inc iden ta l l y t r u e . T h i s e l e m e n t o f co i nc i dence , w h i c h is pe rhaps 
t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t f e a t u r e o f Ge t t i e r cases, is v e r y di f f icul t t o e x p l a i n w i t h o u t i n t r oduc i ng 
s o m e e l e m e n t o f e x t e r n a l c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e ind iv idua l 's bel ief, t h e jus t i f i ca t ion for 
tha t be l ie f a n d t h e s tate o f affairs w h i c h Is t h e ob jec t o f t h e belief. G o l d m a n ' s o r ig ina l 
p r o p o s a l w a s t o f ocus o n t h e causa l c o n n e c t i o n s that t yp i ca l l y o b t a i n b e t w e e n these 
va r i ous ep is temica l l y re levan t i tems w h e n a p e r s o n has k n o w l e d g e . 
G o l d m a n e x p r e s s e d his p roposa l as a set o f t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n s fo r k n o w l e d g e , in t h e 
f o l l o w i n g p lan f o r m : 
[A p e r s o n ] S k n o w s that p if a n d o n l y if t h e fact p is causa l ly c o n n e c t e d in a n ' appropr ia te ' 
w a y w i t h S's be l i ev ing p. 
T h e w a y s tha t are ' app rop r i a t e ' i n c l ude p e r c e p t i o n , m e m o r y , va r i ous o t h e r k inds o f causal 
cha ins a n d c o m b i n a t i o n s o f these . G o l d m a n adds t o th is t h e f u r t h e r c o n d i t i o n that the 
re levan t causal c o n n e c t i o n s ob ta in ing b e t w e e n t h e state o f affairs p a n d one 's bel ie f 
m u s t b e ' co r rec t l y r e c o n s t r u c t e d b y in ferences, e a c h o f w h i c h is w a r r a n t e d ' . T h i s f u r t h e r 
c o n d i t i o n is d e s i g n e d t o a c c o m m o d a t e t h e fact tha t causal cha ins c a n s o m e t i m e s take 
m u c h u n e x p e c t e d rou tes . If t h e r o u t e is u n u s u a l e n o u g h , t h e n e v e n t h o u g h it results 
in a t r ue be l ie f that p, it d o e s no t p r o v i d e k n o w l e d g e . Fo r e x a m p l e , s u p p o s e that Sally 
pe rce i ves a n ob jec t o n l y t h r o u g h a c o m p l e x n e t w o r k o f mi r ro rs , o r v ia s o m e h o l o g r a p h i c 
i m a g i n g d e v i c e w h i c h p r o d u c e s a v e r y realist ic i m a g e o f t h e o b j e c t . T h e n , she m i g h t c o m e 
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t o be l i eve tha t t h e ob jec t is in f r on t o f he r w h e n in fac t it is, b u t s h e m i g h t fail t o k n o w 
tha t it is t h e r e , as she k n o w s n o t h i n g a b o u t t h e u n u s u a l causal m e c h a n i s m . If she w e r e 
in a pos i t i on t o co r rec t l y r econs t ruc t t h e causal cha in , h o w e v e r , t h e n she w o u l d h a v e 
k n o w l e d g e . 
O n e e x a m p l e d e v e l o p e d b y G o l d m a n that i l lustrates t h e in tu i t i ve a p p e a l o f his p roposa l 
i n v o l v e s a p e r s o n , S m i t h , w h o pe rce i ves sol id i f ied lava l y ing a r o u n d a m o u n t a i n . O n t h e 
basis o f bel iefs a b o u t th is lava, a n d b a c k g r o u n d bel iefs, S m i t h in fe rent ia l l y c o m e s to 
be l ieve , cor rec t l y , tha t t h e m o u n t a i n e r u p t e d m a n y cen tu r i es a g o . A s s u m i n g tha t S m i t h s 
in fe rences a re w a r r a n t e d , d o e s h e k n o w ? T o a n s w e r this, w e m u s t ask w h a t so r t o f causal 
a n c e s t r y ob ta ins b e t w e e n t h e e r u p t i o n o f t h e m o u n t a i n a n d Smith 's be l ie f tha t it has 
e r u p t e d . If t h e lava tha t h e sees resu l ted f r o m t h e e r u p t i o n , as h e i m a g i n e s , t h e n Smi th 
d o e s h a v e k n o w l e d g e . H o w e v e r , s u p p o s e tha t u n k n o w n t o S m i t h t h e lava has b e e n p laced 
t h e r e b y p r o m o t e r s w h o w i s h t o m a k e it l ook as t h o u g h t h e area w a s o n c e vo lcan ic . 
T h e lava ac tua l l y p r o d u c e d b y t h e e r u p t i o n has b e e n c o m p l e t e l y c o v e r e d b y yea rs o f 
s e d i m e n t a t i o n , a n d c a n n o t be s e e n . T h e n , t h e r e is n o a p p r o p r i a t e causa l c o n n e c t i o n 
b e t w e e n e r u p t i o n a n d p e r c e i v e d lava, a n d Smi th d o e s no t k n o w . T h e na tu ra l l y in tu i t i ve 
appea l o f s u c h an e x a m p l e is c o n f i r m a t i o n tha t G o l d m a n ' s causal t h e o r y cap tu res at least 
par t o f w h a t w e requ i re fo r k n o w l e d g e . 
7. T h e G e t t i e r P r o b l e m 
G o l d m a n ' s ea r l y art ic le w a s o n e o f m a n y tha t a p p e a r e d w i t h i n a f e w yea rs o f t h e 
pub l i ca t i on o f E d m u n d Get t ie r 's vas t l y in f luent ia l paper , T h e Ana l ys i s o f K n o w l e d g e " 
(1963). G e t t i e r g a v e a c o u p l e o f c o u n t e r - e x a m p l e s t o w h a t h e ca l led t h e " t rad i t i ona l " 
analys is o f k n o w l e d g e . A c c o r d i n g t o th is analysis, S k n o w s tha t q if a n d o n l y if: 
• p i s t r u e 
• S be l i eves tha t p 
• S is jus t i f ied in b e l i e v i n g tha t p 
As G o l d m a n n o t e s at t h e e n d o f t h e art ic le, a n analys is is no t i n t e n d e d t o g i v e t h e 
m e a n i n g o f t h e t e r m it ana l yzes , b u t o n l y its t r u th - cond i t i ons . N o r d o e s it g i v e "ver i f i ca t ion 
c o n d i t i o n s , " c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h o n e c o u l d tel l t ha t S k n o w s t ha t p. 
G e t t i e r s h o w e d tha t t h e s e cond i t i ons can be sat isf ied in t h e a b s e n c e o f k n o w l e d g e . O n e 
o f his e x a m p l e s i n v o l v e s a p e r s o n . S m i t h , w h o w o r k s in t h e s a m e of f ice as J o n e s . Sm i th has 
exce l l en t e v i d e n c e that : 
q : J o n e s o w n s a F o r d 
J o n e s has o w n e d a F o r d fo r a l ong t i m e a n d has jus t o f f e red S m i t h a r ide in o n e . T h e g l i t ch 
is tha t J o n e s d o e s no t n o w o w n a F o r d , h a v i n g jus t so ld it. H e has o f f e r e d S m i t h a r ide in a 
renta l car. So q is false, a n d S m i t h d o e s no t k n o w tha t q . 
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None the less , Sm i th has m a d e a logical i n fe rence f r o m q to a n o t h e r p r o p o s i t i o n w h i c h he 
be l ieves : 
p: J o n e s o w n s a F o r d o r B r o w n is in Barce lona 
T h i s f o l l o w s log ica l ly f r o m q . T h a t is t o say, if q is t rue , t h e n p m u s t b e t r ue b y t h e m e a n i n g 
o f t h e log ica l w o r d "o r . "Ge t t i e r p laus ib ly ma in ta ins that if Sm i th is jus t i f ied in be l i ev ing q, 
t h e n h e is jus t i f i ed in be l i ev ing p. 
W e s u p p o s e f u r t h e r tha t Sm i th m a d e his in fe rence b y p ick ing a c i t y at r a n d o m . H e had n o 
idea o f B rown ' s w h e r e a b o u t s . But it t u r n s ou t , b y t h e pu res t c o i n c i d e n c e tha t B r o w n in fact 
is in Ba rce lona .Th i s m e a n s , aga in b y t h e log ic o f " o r , " t h a t p is t rue . So b y t h e " t rad i t i ona l " 
analysis, S m i t h k n o w s tha t p .Ye t it is imp laus ib le that Sm i th has this k n o w l e d g e , s ince his 
be l ie f is t r u e o n l y b y co inc idence . 
G o l d m a n ' s S o l u t i o n 
In t h e 1967 paper , G o l d m a n p r o p o s e d that t h e p r o b l e m h e r e is tha t " w h a t m a k e s p t rue 
is t h e fac t tha t B r o w n is in Barce lona , bu t tha t this fact has n o t h i n g t o d o w i t h Smith 's 
be l i ev ing tha t p. "Smi th 's be l ie f tha t p w a s a r r i ved at f r o m q . H e c o u l d h a v e subs t i t u ted a n y 
t r u t h in t h e p lace o f t h e t r u t h tha t B r o w n is in Barce lona a n d a r r i ved at a jus t i f ied bel ief 
a b o u t that . 
S o G o l d m a n o f f e r e d as a so l u t i on a n e w c o n d i t i o n o n k n o w l e d g e , n o t f o u n d in " t rad i t i ona l " 
ana lys is : tha t w h a t m a k e s p t r u e m u s t be t h e cause o f S's b e l i e v i n g tha t p. ( N o t e that th is is 
o f f e red o n l y as a c o n d i t i o n fo r emp i r i ca l k n o w l e d g e . ) W h a t G o l d m a n m u s t d o to m a k e his 
a c c o u n t p laus ib le is t o s h o w tha t it can be g e n e r a l i z e d to all cases o f emp i r i ca l k n o w l e d g e . 
H e d o e s this b y p r o v i d i n g a s u r v e y o f t y p e s o f causal c o n n e c t i o n s . 
8. P r o b l e m s f o r t h e c a u s a l t h e o r y 
C o r r e c t r e c o n s t r u c t i o n w i t h o u t k n o w l e d g e : In s o m e cases, it s e e m s tha t o n e d o e s no t 
k n o w that p, e v e n t h o u g h o n e has p r o p e r l y r e c o n s t r u c t e d t h e causal c h a i n f r o m the 
fact tha t p to one 's be l ie f that p. For e x a m p l e , if S infers tha t t h e m o u n t a i n e r u p t e d m a n y 
cen tu r ies a g o f r o m his bel ie f that t h e r e is sol id i f ied lava t h r o u g h o u t t h e c o u n t r y s i d e for 
h a p h a z a r d reasons ; S doesn ' t s e e m to c o u n t as k n o w i n g that t h e m o u n t a i n e r u p t e d m a n y 
cen tu r i es a g o . 
T h i s is w h y G o l d m a n requ i res tha t t h e i n f e r e n c e s i n a r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f a causal c o n n e c t i o n 
be w a r r a n t e d : " t h e p ropos i t i ons o n w h i c h [ the sub jec t ] bases his be l ie f o f p m u s t g e n u i n e l y 
c o n f i r m p v e r y h igh ly , w h e t h e r d e d u c t i v e l y o r I n d u c t i v e l y " ( p . 363). 
T h i s add i t i ona l r e q u i r e m e n t avo ids t h e p r o b l e m , bu t it a lso makes t h e resu l t ing t h e o r y 
. no t a p u r e l y causa l t h e o r y : t rad i t iona l no t i ons o f jus t i f ied in fe rences are n o w p lay ing a 
cruc ia l ro le. 
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k n o w l e d g e w i t h o u t co r rec t r econs t ruc t i on : In s o m e cases, i t s e e m s tha t c n e can k n o w that 
p, e v e n t h o u g h o n e has i m p r o p e r l y r econs t r uc ted t h e causal cha in f r o m t h e fac t tha t p t o 
one 's be l ie f tha t p. G o l d m a n m i g h t r e s p o n d b y rev is ing his a c c o u n t so tha t o n e c a n c o u n t 
as k n o w i n g s o m e t h i n g if o n e makes a series o f w a r r a n t e d in fe rences tha t r econs t ruc t a 
causal cha in tha t w o u l d h a v e b e e n suf f ic ient t o b r ing a b o u t t h e fac t in q u e s t i o n , e v e n if 
tha t cha in d idn ' t as a ma t te r o f fact b r ing it abou t . H o w e v e r , th is o n c e aga in adds a b i g g e r 
ro le to w a r r a n t e d in fe rences in t h e overa l l t h e o r y . (A lso , t h e r e Is a w o r r y tha t this w a y o f 
rev is ing t h e t h e o r y m a k e s it suscept ib le to Get t ie r -s ty le c o u n t e r e x a m p l e s . ) 
K n o w l e d g e o f ex is ten t ia l a n d un iversa l genera l i za t i ons : T h e causal t h e o r y is bes t 
d e s i g n e d t o h a n d l e o u r k n o w l e d g e o f speci f ic facts a b o u t t h e e x t e r n a l w o r l d ; it has a 
m o r e di f f icul t t i m e a c c o u n t i n g fo r o u r k n o w l e d g e o f ex is ten t ia l gene ra l i za t i ons a n d 
un i ve rsa l gene ra l i za t i ons . A f te r all, t hese sor ts o f facts d o n o t s e e m to h a v e causes, o r t o 
cause a n y t h i n g . 
G o l d m a n p r o p o s e s t h e f o l l o w i n g pr inc ip le b r o a d e n i n g o f o u r use o f t h e w o r d " c a u s e " ( p . 368): 
If x is log ica l ly re la ted t o y , a n d if y is a cause o f z , t h e n x is a cause o f z . 
T h e n w e c a n i nc l ude ex is tent ia l a n d un iversa l gene ra l i za t i ons in causa l cha ins , a n d a p p l y 
t h e t h e o r y in t h e s t a n d a r d w a y t o a c c o u n t fo r o u r k n o w l e d g e o f s u c h facts. 
O n e p r o b l e m : s o m e t i m e s G o l d m a n i n te rp re t s " x is log ica l ly re la ted t o y " t o m e a n " x entai ls 
y , " a n d o t h e r t imes G o l d m a n i n t e r p r e t s " x is log ica l ly re la ted t o y " t o m e a n " x is en ta i led b y 
y . " 
9. S o m e ( s u p p o s e d ) B e n e f i t s o f t h e C a u s a l T h e o r y 
• T h e causal t h e o r y n i ce ly hand les t h e s tandard Ge t t i e r cases. 
• T h e causa l t h e o r y doesn ' t requ i re tha t o n e be ab le to state one 's jus t i f i ca t ion fo r be l i ev ing 
that p .Th is m a k e s it e a s y t o a c c o u n t fo r one 's k n o w l e d g e o f facts w h o s e jus t i f i ca t ion o n e 
has f o r g o t t e n . 
• Because t h e list o f a p p r o p r i a t e causal p rocesses is left o p e n , t h e causa l t h e o r y leaves 
r o o m for p r e s e n t l y con t rove rs ia l causal p rocesses that w e m a y later d e e m t o be g e n u i n e l y 
k n o w l e d g e - p r o d u c i n g . 
« T h e causal t h e o r y unseats t h e t rad i t iona l a s s u m p t i o n " that e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l ques t i ons are 
ques t i ons o f log ic o r jus t i f i ca t ion , no t causal o r gene t i c q u e s t i o n s " 
10. G o l d m a n ' s A n a l y s i s o f K n o w l e d g e : 
S k n o w s that p t h e fact tha t p is causal ly c o n n e c t e d in an " a p p r o p r i a t e " w a y w i t h S's 
be l i ev ing p." W h e r e "app rop r ia te w a y s " a r e : 
(1) p e r c e p t i o n 
(2) m e m o r y 
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(3) a causal cha in , e x e m p l i f y i n g e i ther Pat te rn 1 o r 2, w h i c h is co r rec t l y r e c o n s t r u c t e d 
b y in fe rences , e a c h o f w h i c h is w a r r a n t e d ( b a c k g r o u n d p ropos i t i ons h e l p w a r r a n t an 
i n fe rence o n l y if t h e y are t rue ) 
(4) c o m b i n a t i o n s o f (1), (2), a n d (3). 
"...the causal r e q u i r e m e n t a n d t h e co r rec t - r econs t ruc t i on r e q u i r e m e n t are a b s e n t f rom. . . 
o l de r analys is [es] . T h e s e add i t i ona l r e q u i r e m e n t s enab le m y analys is to c i r c u m v e n t 
Get t ie r ' s c o u n t e r e x a m p l e s to t h e t rad i t iona l o n e . But m y analys is is w e a k e r t h a n t h e 
t rad i t iona l analys is in a n o t h e r respec t . In at least o n e p o p u l a r i n t e rp re ta t i on o f t h e 
t rad i t iona l analys is [ J T B ] , a k n o w e r m u s t b e ab le t o jus t i f y o r g i v e e v i d e n c e for a n y 
p r o p o s i t i o n h e k n o w s . Fo r S t o k n o w p at t, S m u s t be able, at t, t o s tate his jus t i f i ca t ion fo r 
be l i ev ing p,or his g r o u n d s fo r p . M y analys is makes n o s u c h r e q u i r e m e n t , a n d t h e absence 
o f th is r e q u i r e m e n t enab les m e to a c c o u n t for cases o f k n o w l e d g e tha t w o u l d w r o n g l y be 
e x c l u d e d b y t h e t rad i t iona l ana lys is . " 
G o l d m a n c la ims, fo r e x a m p l e , tha t his bel ie f tha t L inco ln w a s b o r n in 1809 is k n o w l e d g e 
e v e n t h o u g h it is g r o u n d e d b y m e m o r y , a n d w h e r e h e has f o r g o t t e n t h e m e m o r y 
g r o u n d s . 
G o l d m a n w o u l d t rea t k n o w l e d g e o f one 's o w n m e n t a l states as a causal s i tua t ion w h e r e i n 
t h e r e is an i den t i t y b e t w e e n w h a t is b e l i e v e d a n d t h e be l i ev ing in t h e n o r m a l s i t u a t i o n - a 
" d e g e n e r a t e causa l c h a i n " w h i c h i s " z e r o l inks long . " 
11. I n t e m a l i s m a n d E x t e r n a l i s m 
A n i m p o r t a n t d i s t i nc t i on in c o n t e m p o r a r y e p i s t e m o l o g y is that b e t w e e n t h e o r ien ta t ions 
o f " e x t e r n a l i s m " a n d " i n te rna l i sm. " In his U n n a t u r a l D o u b t s , M ichae l W i l l i ams main ta ins 
that : 
T h e essence o f external ism.. . Is t o a l l o w k n o w l e d g e w h e n a p e r s o n in fact m e e t s cer ta in 
cond i t i ons , w h e t h e r o r n o t h e k n o w s h e mee ts t h e m . T h e s e c o n d i t i o n s m a y be "ex te rna l , " 
no t j us t in n o t be ing r e p r e s e n t e d in t h e person 's k n o w l e d g e o r bel iefs, b u t in h a v i n g to 
d o w i t h his ac tua l s i tua t ion . T h e capac i t y fo r k n o w l e d g e is t h u s like a n y o t h e r capac i ty : it 
d e p e n d s par t l y o n t h e p o w e r s o f t h e ind iv idua l a n d par t l y o n t h e c i r cums tances in w h i c h 
h e is r e q u i r e d t o exe rc i se t h e m Michae l Wi l l iams, 1991; p. 319). 
in his " U n d e r s t a n d i n g H u m a n K n o w l e d g e in G e n e r a l , " Ba r ry S t r o u d says that ex terna l is t 
a c c o u n t s o f k n o w l e d g e : 
. . .wou ld e x p l a i n k n o w l e d g e in t e r m s o f cond i t i ons tha t are ava i lab le f r o m a n "ex te rna l , " 
t h i r d - p e r s o n p o i n t o f v i e w , i n d e p e n d e n t o f w h a t t h e k n o w e r ' s o w n a t t i t ude t o w a r d s t h e 
fu l f i l lment o f t h o s e cond i t i ons m i g h t be (Bar ry S t roud , 1989; p p . 31 -50). 
In his C o n t e m p o r a r y E p i s t e m o l o g y , Ra lph B a e r g e n ma in ta ins tha t : 
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... internalists p e r f o r m the i r ep i s temic eva lua t i ons f r o m t h e f i r s t -pe rson po in t o f v i e w , 
tak ing i n to a c c o u n t o n l y tha t w h i c h w a s avai lab le t o t h e sub jec t w h e n t h e be l ie f be ing 
e v a l u a t e d w a s f o r m e d (o r ma in ta i ned , o r rev i sed) , w h i l e ex te rna l i s ts e v a l u a t e f r o m t h e 
po in t o f v i e w o f a fu l l y i n f o r m e d o b s e r v e r - - w h a t o n e m i g h t cal l t h e t h i r d p e r s o n po in t o f 
v i e w ( R a l p h B a e r g e n , 1995; p. 9). 
T h e i m p o r t a n c e o f t h e d is t inc t ion is e m p h a s i z e d b y R o b e r t F o g e l i n in his P y r r h o n i a n 
Ref lec t ions o n K n o w l e d g e a n d Just i f i ca t ion : 
. . . just i f icatory p e r f o r m a n c e s c o m e in a v a r i e t y o f f o r m s r a n g i n g at t h e e x t r e m e s f r o m 
t h o s e tha t I n v o l v e c o m p l e x ra t ioc inat ion t o t h o s e that re ly u p o n t h e un re f l ec t l ve use o f a 
p e r c e p t u a l p o w e r o r capac i ty . B o t h can be ca r r ied o u t In a respons ib l e o r a n i r respons ib le 
m a n n e r ; b o t h c a n es tab l i sh o r fall t o es tab l i sh t h e t r u t h o f s o m e bel ief. B o t h a re sou rces 
o f k n o w l e d g e . Un t i l re la t i ve ly recent ly , p h i l o s o p h e r s h a v e o f t e n t e n d e d t o th ink o f 
k n o w l e d g e as so le ly t h e p r o d u c t o f in te l lectual ac t iv i ty . T h e ex te rna l i s ts h a v e m a d e 
an i m p o r t a n t c o n t r i b u t i o n t o e p i s t e m o l o g y b y b reak ing t h e spel l o f th is intel lectual ist 
p re jud i ce ( R o b e r t F o g e l i n , 1994: p.48). 
W e n e e d t o ask : "Does G o l d m a n ' s causal t h e o r y cons t i t u te an "ex te rna l i sm"? " N o t qu i te , 1 
c o n t e n d - h Is "co r rec t r e c o n s t r u c t i o n c o n d i t i o n " s e e m s to leave h i m w i t h at least o n e foo t in 
t h e in ternal is t c a m p ! As F o g e l i n r e c o m m e n d s , G o l d m a n m a y a p p e a r to h a v e inc l inat ions 
b o t h w a y s . T h e cen t ra l m o t i v a t i o n fo r t h e "causal t h e o r y , " h o w e v e r , is s t r o n g l y ex terna l is t -
-it is t h e a p p e a l t o " e x t e r n a l , " " t h i r d - p e r s o n , " causal c o n n e c t i o n s w h i c h is t o o v e r c o m e 
t h e Ge t t i e r p r o b l e m s a n d e n s u r e t h e a d e q u a c y o f t h e analys is o f k n o w l e d g e ! A n d t h e 
issues w h i c h G o l d m a n raises in his d iscuss ion o f t h e va r i ous cases c e n t e r u p o n w h e t h e r 
t h e causal c o n n e c t i o n s o b t a i n , no t w h e t h e r t h e ind iv idua l is a w a r e o f the i r ob ta in i ng . 
Foge l i n ma in ta ins , h o w e v e r , t h a t as G o l d m a n shifts f r o m s imp l y d e m a n d i n g t h e ex i s tence 
o f u n b r o k e n causal cha ins t o d e m a n d i n g that t h e i nd i v idua l b e ab le to a lso o f fer t h e r igh t 
sor t o f " r econs t ruc t i on , "h i s v i e w shifts s ign i f icant ly : tha t t h e s e are v e r y d i f fe ren t pos i t ions 
is c lear b e c a u s e t h e f irst c o n d i t i o n w o u l d n o t d i sbar an ima ls f r o m p rocess ing k n o w l e d g e , 
w h e r e a s t h e s e c o n d c o n d i t i o n p r e s u m a b l y w o u l d " ( Ib id. p. 54). 
12. G o l d m a n ' s a n s w e r s t o p o s s i b l e o b j e c t i o n s 
T o t h o s e w h o m a i n t a i n tha t h e of fers a b a d analysis o f t h e m e a n i n g o f k n o w l e d g e ' : 
G o l d m a n ma in ta ins h e is i n te res ted In o n l y g i v i n g t h e t r u t h cond i t i ons fo r k n o w l e d g e . 
G o l d m a n ' s r e p l y t o s u c h cr i t ics a b o v e is impo r t an t . T h e d i s t i nc t i on b e t w e e n p r o v i d i n g a n 
analys is o f t h e m e a n i n g o f a t e r m a n d p r o v i d i n g an a c c o u n t o f t h e t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s fo r t h e 
app l i ca t ion o f a t e r m wi l l b e i m p o r t a n t as w e c o n t i n u e t h r o u g h t h e c o u r s e . 
T o t h o s e w h o c o m p l a i n tha t his analys is makes it di f f icul t t o tel l w h e t h e r s o m e o n e k n o w s 
s o m e t h i n g : 
G o l d m a n ma in ta ins that " ve r i f i ca t i on "cond i t i ons " ( ra ther t h a n t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s ) are w h a t 
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are i m p o r t a n t r e l evan t to th is issue, a n d he it is t h e lat ter h e is c o n c e r n e d w i t h - t h u s he is 
no t c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h e issue o f ve r i f y i ng w h e t h e r ind iv idua ls h a v e k n o w l e d g e . 
G o l d m a n , t h e n , is no t a t t e m p t i n g to a n s w e r t h e ques t i ons " W h a t d o w e m e a n b y 
k n o w l e d g e ? " o r " H o w can w e tell w h e n w e k n o w ? " Ins tead , he is o n l y in te res ted in 
a n s w e r i n g t h e q u e s t i o n " W h a t is k n o w l e d g e ? " 
T o t h o s e w h o raise skept ica l p r o b l e m s : 
G o l d m a n ma in ta ins that he has no t a t t e m p t e d t o r e s p o n d t o skept ica l p r o b l e m s . 
G o l d m a n r e c o g n i z e s tha t his analys is dev ia tes f r o m a s t r ong t rad i t i on in p h i l o s o p h y w h i c h 
sepa ra ted q u e s t i o n s o f jus t i f i ca t ion f r o m ques t i ons o f causa t ion . 
13. C r i t i c i s m s o f G o l d m a n ' s C a u s a l T h e o r y 
01. Ra lph B e r g e n ma in ta ins that : 
O n e w o n d e r s w h e t h e r , if a n d w h e n w e d o a r r i ve at a m o r e c o m p l e t e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f 
causa t i on , t h e causal c o n n e c t i o n s in all t hese cases wi l l be f o u n d t o h a v e m u c h in c o m m o n . 
T o p u t th is a n o t h e r w a y , w h a t reason h a v e w e to s u p p o s e tha t we ' l l b e ab le t o po in t to a 
s ing le sor t o f causal c o n n e c t i o n {or to a s ing le set o f fea tu res o f s u c h c o n n e c t i o n s ) a n d 
say tha t t hese a n d o n l y these suff ice for k n o w l e d g e ? W h y m i g h t it no t be tha t t h e cases in 
w h i c h w e j u d g e a sub jec t as h a v i n g k n o w l e d g e e x e m p l i f y a w i d e r a n g e o f causal stories, 
a n d tha t w h a t is c o m m o n to all t hese cases o f k n o w l e d g e is s o m e t h i n g o t h e r t h a n causal 
or ig ins? (Ra lph B a e r g e n , 1995: p. 115). 
B a e r g e n also g o e s o n t o cr i t ic ize G o l d m a n ' s t h e o r y , h o w e v e r , as be ing t o o s t rong : 
If, as m a n y p h i l o s o p h e r s are inc l ined to th ink, p u r e sets, n u m b e r s , o r poss ib le w o r l d s are 
abs t rac t ob jec ts , G o l d m a n ' s t h e o r y w o u l d no t p e r m i t us t o h a v e k n o w l e d g e o f t h e m ; t h e 
reason for th is is tha t s u c h ent i t ies c a n n o t be i n v o l v e d in a n y causa t i on wha tsoeve r . " ( l b i d . , 
p. 119). 
T h i s c r i t ique is un fa i r h o w e v e r . As I n o t e d at t h e b e g i n n i n g o f o u r d i scuss ion o f G o l d m a n ' s 
essay, h e exp l i c i t l y l imits h imse l f t o emp i r i ca l k n o w l e d g e c la ims! 
In add i t i on , B a e r g e n no tes that m a n y be l ieve t h e n o t i o n o f causa t i on is i tself bank rup t , 
a n d G o l d m a n ' s t h e o r y m u s t h a v e a r e s p o n s e t o t hese c o n c e r n s . 
02. In h is"Sc ient i f i c Real ism a n d Natura l is t ic E p i s t e m o l o g y / ' R i c h a r d B o y d ma in ta ins that : 
...the issue in scient i f ic k n o w l e d g e is no t t h e rel iable p r o d u c t i o n o f bel iefs. T h e rel iabi l i ty 
w h i c h scient i f ic prac t ice d isp lays is no t so m u c h a ma t te r o f h o w bel iefs are p r o d u c e d 
or e v e n o f h o w t h e y are init ial ly a c c e p t e d , b u t o f t h e t e n d e n c y o v e r t i m e fo r bel iefs to 
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be sus ta ined o n l y if t h e y are a p p r o x i m a t e l y t r u e a n d for bel iefs t o be m o d i f i e d in t h e 
d i r ec t i on o f c loser a n d c loser a p p r o x i m a t i o n s to the t r u t h . W h a t is at s take is rel iabi l i ty 
in t h e r e g u l a t i o n o f be l ie f ( o v e r t ime) ra ther t h a n rel iabi l i ty in t h e initial p r o d u c t i o n o r 
a c c e p t a n c e o f par t icu lar bel iefs. I n d e e d , I th ink that th is wi l l p r o v e t o b e t r u e in m a n y 
cases o f e v e r y d a y bel ie f as w e l l (R ichard B o y d , 1981: pp . 613 - 662). 
03. F r e d D r e t s k e of fers a cr i t ic ism w h i c h arises o u t o f G o l d m a n ' s " l ava "case . D r e t s k e asks us 
to i m a g i n e t w o m o u n t a i n s , M a n d N , a n d a lava f l o w w h i c h c o m e s f r o m M b u t c o u l d h a v e 
c o m e f r o m N . O f th is case D r e t s k e says t h e f o l l ow ing : 
In s u c h c i r c u m s t a n c e s G o l d m a n ' s necessa ry c o n d i t i o n is sat isf ied, b u t m i n e is no t . (2d) is 
false; it is false tha t t h e lava w o u l d no t be the re , a n d d i s t r i bu ted in th is f a s h i o n un less M 
had e r u p t e d . Fo r if, c o n t r a r y t o hypo thes i s , M had no t e r u p t e d , N w o u l d h a v e ; l eav ing t h e 
v e r y s a m e ( re levan t ) traces. 
In s u c h c i r cums tances I d o no t t h i nk w e c o u l d say that S k n e w tha t M e r u p t e d o n t h e basis 
o f t h e p resen t ex i s t ence a n d d is t r i bu t ion o f l ava . " (F red Dre tske , 1978: pp . 41 - 60). 
04. In h i s "Ep i s tem ic Luck a n d t h e Pure l y Ep is temic , " R ichard F o l e y ma in ta ins that : 
W e can cr i t ic ize t h e person 's in te l lectua l character , o r his c o g n i t i v e e q u i p m e n t , w i t h o u t 
cr i t ic iz ing e v e r y t h i n g w h i c h is a p r o d u c t o f tha t cha rac te r o r e q u i p m e n t . A be l ie f can be 
rat ional e v e n t h o u g h w h a t p r o m p t s t h e be l i eve r t o c h o o s e his be l ie f o r w h a t c o g n i t i v e 
e q u i p m e n t causes h i m t o h a v e t h e bel ie f r egu la r l y p r o d u c e s ep is temic h o w l e r s . In such 
cases, w e s h o u l d admit . . . that t h e be l i eve r has b e e n ep is temic al ly l ucky (R ichard Foley, 
1 9 8 4 : p p . 1 1 3 - 1 2 4 ) . 
05. A n u m b e r o f in te res t ing cr i t ic isms a r e c o n t a i n e d in Marsha l l S w a i n ' s " K n o w l e d g e , C a u s a l i t y , 
a n d Jus t i f i ca t ion . " (Marsha l l S w a i n , 1972: p p . 291 - 300). 
06. In h i s T h e Ge t t i e r P r o b l e m a n d t h e Ana lys is o f K n o w l e d g e , "Ke i t h Leh re r o f fers a d is t inc t ion 
w h i c h e m p o w e r s a c r i t i que o f causal theor ies o f k n o w i n g : 
L e h r e r d i s t i ngu i shes b e t w e e n accep tance a n d bel ief : " t o accep t a p r o p o s i t i o n in this 
c o n t e x t m e a n s to assen t t o it w h e n one 's o n l y p u r p o s e is t o assen t t o w h a t is t r u e a n d to 
re fuse to assent t o w h a t is fa lse. " (Ke i th Lehrer , 1979: pp .65 - 78). 
H e clari f ies:"a p e r s o n m a y be l i eve s o m e t h i n g fo r t h e w r o n g reasons , p e r h a p s h e c a n n o t 
h e l p b u t d o so, a n d , n e v e r t h e l e s s , k n o w that it is t r u e b e c a u s e h e assents to it for t h e r igh t 
reasons . " ( Ibid. , p. 66). Be l iev ing s o m e t h i n g [causal ly] b e c a u s e t h e "s tars" say it is so, bu t 
assen t ing to it o n p r o p e r ep i s temic g r o u n d s . 
A c c o r d i n g t o h i m , " th is dist inct ion.. .v i t iates t h o s e causal t h e o r i e s o f k n o w l e d g e that 
m a i n t a i n tha t w h e t h e r a p e r s o n k n o w s s o m e t h i n g t o be t r u e d e p e n d s o n t h e causal 
re la t ion b e t w e e n a p e r s o n be l i ev ing s o m e t h i n g a n d t h e fact tha t it is so. Bel ief m a y ar ise 
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in par t i cu la r a n d s u n d r y w a y s , b u t n o ma t te r h o w a p e r s o n c o m e s t o be l i eve s o m e t h i n g , 
a n d n o m a t t e r h o w his be l ie f is sus ta ined , h e m a y k n o w tha t w h a t he be l ieves is t r ue if h e 
accepts t h e p r o p o s i t i o n in q u e s t i o n o n p r o p e r g r o u n d s . " ( I b i d ) . 
H e of fers an add i t i ona l cr i t ic ism o f causal theor ies : 
W h i l e c o n s i d e r i n g mod i f i ca t ions o f t h e or ig ina l N o g o t e x a m p l e , ! s h o u l d also like to m a k e 
it c lear tha t a v e r y s imp le mod i f i ca t i on o f that e x a m p l e suff ices t o de fea t a t t e m p t s to deal 
w i t h t h e Ge t t i e r p r o b l e m in causal te rms , for e x a m p l e , b y requ i r i ng t h e fac t that makes a 
p r o p o s i t i o n a p e r s o n be l ieves t r ue be a cause o f his be l i ev ing it. 
14. G o l d m a n ' s R e v i s i o n s 
In d iscuss ing A l v i n G o l d m a n ' s m o r e recen t v i e w s ( e x p r e s s e d in h i s " E p i s t e m i c F o l k w a y s 
a n d Scient i f ic E p i s t e m o l o g y " ) , in his A n I n t r o d u c t i o n t o C o n t e m p o r a r y E p i s t e m o l o g y , 
Mat th ias S t e u p ma in ta ins that : 
G o l d m a n ' s n e w a p p r o a c h t o t h e analys is o f jus t i f ied belief, t h o u g h still rel iabil ist, p r o c e e d s 
in t e r m s o f in te l lec tua l v i r t u e s a n d v ices . T h u s G o l d m a n is n o w m e r g i n g t w o d i f ferent 
theore t i ca l s t rands: re l iabi l ism a n d v i r t u e e p i s t e m o l o g y . A c c o r d i n g to t h e v i r t u e a p p r o a c h 
t o t h e analys is o f jus t i f ied belief, a bel ie f is jus t i f ied if it resul ts f r o m a n in te l lectua l v i r t u e 
a n d un jus t i f i ed if it resul ts f r o m an inte l lectual v ice . . . .Accord ing t o G o l d m a n , in te l lectual 
v i r t ues are c o g n i t i v e p rocesses w e d e e m rel iable, a n d in te l lec tua l v i ces are c o g n i t i v e 
p rocesses w e d e e m unre l iab le . T h e c r i te r ion fo r d i sc r im ina t ing b e t w e e n t h e inte l lectual 
v i r t ues a n d v ices , t h e n , is that o f rel iabi l i ty (Mat th ias S t e u p l 996: p. 170). 
15. C o n c l u s i o n 
A l v i n G o l d m a n , o n c e t h e ma in d e f e n d e r o f t h e causa l t h e o r y , f o r m u l a t e d it as fo l l ows ' 
k n o w s tha t p if t h e fac t that p is causa l ly c o n n e c t e d in an ' app rop r i a te ' w a y w i t h X's 
be l i ev ing p. 
( T h e a b o v e f o r m u l a t i o n o b v i o u s l y inc ludes t h e idea tha t p is t r u e ( ' the fac t tha t p') a n d tha t 
X be l i eves tha t p. It s t r o n g l y sugges t s , c o n t r a r y t o G o l d m a n ' s o w n r e m a r k that h e w a n t s to 
a d d t h e causal c o n d i t i o n to t h e t rad i t iona l analysis, tha t G o l d m a n is in fact rep lac ing the 
jus t i f i ca t ion c o n d i t i o n b y t h e causal cond i t i on ) . 
G o l d m a n r e c o g n i z e s tha t his p r o p o s e d analys is in t h e face o f t rad i t i on . In t h e first place, it 
is en t i r e l y s i lent r e g a r d i n g s k e p t i c i s m . T h e skept ica l q u e s t i o n Is j us t I r re levant to w h e t h e r 
o n e k n o w s , g i v e n t h e causal accoun t . M o r e impo r tan t l y , it d o e s no t c o n f i n e t h e analys is 
m e r e l y t o "ques t i ons o f logic o r jus t i f i ca t ion . " Ins tead, it f ocuses o n "causal o r g e n e t i c 
q u e s t i o n s . " A l t h o u g h p e o p l e d i d no t use t h e e x p r e s s i o n at t h e t ime , w e c a n say n o w that 
h e is p r o p o s i n g a n " e x t e r n a l i s t " a c c o u n t o f k n o w l e d g e . 
In his later w o r k , G o l d m a n d e s e r t e d t h e let ter o f t h e causal analys is , b u t no t its spirit. In the 
1979 paper , " W h a t is Jus t i f i ed Bel ief" G o l d m a n a l l o w e d tha t "p r inc ip les o f Just i f ied bel ie f 
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m u s t m a k e r e f e r e n c e t o causes o f belief." But ra ther t h a n f ocus o n ac tua l "causa l cha ins , " 
h e t u r n e d t o t h e rel iabi l i ty o f t h e p rocesses that cause o u r be l i e f s .Thus h e w a s o n e o f t h e 
ear l y a d v o c a t e s o f " re l iab i l ism" in e p i s t e m o l o g y , t h o u g h t h e idea can b e t r aced back at 
least to ea r l y p e r i o d , w h e n F.P.Ramsey g a v e an analys is o f k n o w l e d g e t ha t m a d e rel iabi l i ty 
a c o n d i t i o n in a v e r y b r ie f p a p e r en t i t l ed " K n o w l e d g e . " 
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